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Appendix A

NPG Montebello Decision, 1983^{*}

The Montebello Decision on Reductions of Nuclear Forces announced by the Nuclear Planning Group in Ministerial Session

Annex to the Final Communiqué of the Autumn Ministerial Meeting, 27 October 1983

At Montebello, Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Ministers declared that the policy of the Alliance is to preserve the peace through the maintenance of forces at the lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact threat.

Consistent with this policy the Alliance since 1977 has been conducting analyses aimed at assuring that nuclear weapons in NATO's armoury are held to the minimum number necessary for deterrence, taking account of developments in conventional as well as nuclear forces. On the basis of the initial results of these analyses, the Alliance decided in December 1979 that, unless obviated by successful negotiation with the Soviet Union, the deployment of longer-range weapons (Pershing II and cruise missiles) was essential to restoring the balance and maintaining the integrity of NATO's deterrent posture. The Alliance remains committed to the dual-track decision and its implementation. (1)

At the same time Ministers decided to reduce the NATO stockpile by 1,000 warheads. This withdrawal has been completed. Moreover, Ministers mandated further analysis to determine whether the withdrawal of weapons beyond the 1,000 then decided could be accomplished safely, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of deterrence at the lowest possible level of weapons.

With the Alliance analysis now complete, the Nuclear Planning Group has decided on 27th October, 1983 to withdraw 1,400 warheads during the next several years. This Ministerial decision, taken together with the already accomplished withdrawal of 1,000 warheads will bring to 2,400 the total number of warheads to be removed from Europe since 1979. Moreover, this reduction will not be affected by any deployment

^{*} Text from the NATO on-line library at
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/b831027a.htm>.

of Longer-Range INF (LRINF) since one warhead will be removed for each Pershing II or Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) warhead deployed.

The detailed implementation of this decision as to the precise composition of the stockpile is a matter for the responsible military authorities to determine and a programme to effect this will be worked out and implemented over the next five to six years. In this context, appropriate consideration will be given to short-range systems. NATO's military authorities should report their findings at a future NPG meeting.

Recognizing that for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective, Ministers accordingly identified a range of possible improvements. Ministers established broad criteria which will remain valid for the next decade, including the continuing importance of strengthening conventional forces. The Alliance must, however, take account at all times of changes to Soviet capabilities during this period.

Contrary to the impression that NATO has been fuelling an arms build-up by adding to its nuclear armoury, this sustained programme of reductions will have reduced NATO's nuclear stockpile to the lowest level in over 20 years. Ministers urged the Soviet Union to follow the example set by the Alliance, to halt and reverse its build-up of nuclear forces, and to join NATO in the search for a safer future.

Footnote:

- (1) Greece has expressed its views in the minutes of the NPG at Montebello.

Appendix B

1990 London Declaration^{*}

Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council ("The London Declaration")

London, 6 July 1990

1. Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey towards a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing freedom. They are choosing economic liberty. They are choosing peace. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt.
2. The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new century, it must continue to provide for the common defence. This Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No-one, however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.
3. The unification of Germany means that the division of Europe is also being overcome. A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of free democracies and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European Community will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe. The

^{*} Text from NATO on-line library at
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b900706a.htm>.

move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.

4. We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.
5. We will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of all our members. We have no aggressive intentions and we commit ourselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will never in any circumstance be the first to use force.
6. The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act. We invite all other CSCE member states to join us in this commitment to non- aggression.
7. In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council. We today also invite the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change.
8. Our Alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.
9. We welcome the invitation to NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner to visit Moscow and meet with Soviet leaders.
10. Military leaders from throughout Europe gathered earlier this year in Vienna to talk about their forces and doctrine. NATO proposes

- another such meeting this Autumn to promote common understanding. We intend to establish an entirely different quality of openness in Europe, including an agreement on "Open Skies".
11. The significant presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe demonstrates the underlying political compact that binds North America's fate to Europe's democracies. But, as Europe changes, we must profoundly alter the way we think about defence.
 12. To reduce our military requirements, sound arms control agreements are essential. That is why we put the highest priority on completing this year the first treaty to reduce and limit conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) along with the completion of a meaningful CSBM package. These talks should remain in continuous session until the work is done. Yet we hope to go further. We propose that, once a CFE Treaty is signed, follow-on talks should begin with the same membership and mandate, with the goal of building on the current agreement with additional measures, including measures to limit manpower in Europe. With this goal in mind, a commitment will be given at the time of signature of the CFE Treaty concerning the manpower levels of a unified Germany.
 13. Our objective will be to conclude the negotiations on the follow-on to CFE and CSBMs as soon as possible and looking to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992. We will seek through new conventional arms control negotiations, within the CSCE framework, further far-reaching measures in the 1990s to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe, so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent. NATO's High Level Task Force will formulate a detailed position for these follow-on conventional arms control talks. We will make provisions as needed for different regions to redress disparities and to ensure that no one's security is harmed at any stage. Furthermore, we will continue to explore broader arms control and confidence-building opportunities. This is an ambitious agenda, but it matches our goal: enduring peace in Europe.
 14. As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:
 - NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.

- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.
 - NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.
15. To keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up to date where necessary. But, as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war.
 16. The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.
 17. New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range forces should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. The Allies concerned will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range.
 18. Finally, with the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.
 19. We approve the mandate given in Turnberry to the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to oversee the ongoing work on the adaptation of the Alliance to the new circumstances. It should report its conclusions as soon as possible.
 20. In the context of these revised plans for defence and arms control, and with the advice of NATO Military Authorities and all member states concerned, NATO will prepare a new Allied military

strategy moving away from "forward defence" where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying "flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. NATO will also provide a forum for Allied consultation on the upcoming negotiations on short-range nuclear forces.

21. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should become more prominent in Europe's future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America. We support a CSCE Summit later this year in Paris which would include the signature of a CFE agreement and would set new standards for the establishment, and preservation, of free societies. It should endorse, inter alia:
 - CSCE principles on the right to free and fair elections;
 - CSCE commitments to respect and uphold the rule of law;
 - CSCE guidelines for enhancing economic cooperation, based on the development of free and competitive market economies; and
 - CSCE cooperation on environmental protection.
22. We further propose that the CSCE Summit in Paris decide how the CSCE can be institutionalised to provide a forum for wider political dialogue in a more united Europe. We recommend that CSCE governments establish:
 - a programme for regular consultations among member governments at the Heads of State and Government or Ministerial level, at least once each year, with other periodic meetings of officials to prepare for and follow up on these consultations;
 - a schedule of CSCE review conferences once every two years to assess progress toward a Europe whole and free;
 - a small CSCE secretariat to coordinate these meetings and conferences;
 - a CSCE mechanism to monitor elections in all the CSCE countries, on the basis of the Copenhagen Document;
 - a CSCE Centre for the Prevention of Conflict that might serve as a forum for exchange of military information, discussion of unusual military activities, and the conciliation of disputes involving CSCE member states; and
 - a CSCE parliamentary body, the Assembly of Europe, to be based on the existing parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and include representatives of all CSCE member states.

The sites of these new institutions should reflect the fact that the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe form part of the political structures of the new Europe.

23. Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.

Appendix C

U.S. Presidential Nuclear Initiative, 1991*

Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons

President George H.W. Bush

September 27, 1991

Good evening.

Tonight I'd like to speak with you about our future and the future of the generations to come.

The world has changed at a fantastic pace, with each day writing a fresh page of history before yesterday's ink has even dried. And most recently, we've seen the peoples of the Soviet Union turn to democracy and freedom, and discard a system of government based on oppression and fear.

Like the East Europeans before them, they face the daunting challenge of building fresh political structures, based on human rights, democratic principles, and market economies. Their task is far from easy and far from over. They will need our help, and they will get it.

But these dramatic changes challenge our Nation as well. Our country has always stood for freedom and democracy. And when the newly elected leaders of Eastern Europe grappled with forming their new governments, they looked to the United States. They looked to American democratic principles in building their own free societies. Even the leaders of the U.S.S.R. Republics are reading The Federalist Papers, written by America's founders, to find new ideas and inspiration.

Today, America must lead again, as it always has, as only it can. And we will. We must also provide the inspiration for lasting peace. And we will do that, too. We can now take steps in response to these dramatic developments, steps that can help the Soviet peoples in their quest for peace and prosperity. More importantly, we can now take steps to make the world

* Text from the archives of the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91092704.html>.

a less dangerous place than ever before in the nuclear age.

A year ago, I described a new strategy for American defenses, reflecting the world's changing security environment. That strategy shifted our focus away from the fear that preoccupied us for 40 years, the prospect of a global confrontation. Instead, it concentrated more on regional conflicts, such as the one we just faced in the Persian Gulf.

I spelled out a strategic concept, guided by the need to maintain the forces required to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively in crises, to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, and to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should that be needed.

We are now moving to reshape the U.S. military to reflect that concept. The new base force will be smaller by half a million than today's military, with fewer Army divisions, Air Force wings, Navy ships, and strategic nuclear forces. This new force will be versatile, able to respond around the world to challenges, old and new.

As I just mentioned, the changes that allowed us to adjust our security strategy a year ago have greatly accelerated. The prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe, launched with little or no warning, is no longer a realistic threat. The Warsaw Pact has crumbled. In the Soviet Union, the advocates of democracy triumphed over a coup that would have restored the old system of repression. The reformers are now starting to fashion their own futures, moving even faster toward democracy's horizon.

New leaders in the Kremlin and the Republics are now questioning the need for their huge nuclear arsenal. The Soviet nuclear stockpile now seems less an instrument of national security, and more of a burden. As a result, we now have an unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps -- some on our own, some on their own, some together -- we can dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. We can more effectively discourage the spread of nuclear weapons. We can rely more on defensive measures in our strategic relationship. We can enhance stability and actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. Now is the time to seize this opportunity.

After careful study and consultations with my senior advisers and after considering valuable counsel from Prime Minister Major, President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, and other allied leaders, I am announcing today a series of sweeping initiatives affecting every aspect of our nuclear forces on land, on ships, and on aircraft. I met again today with our Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and I can tell you they wholeheartedly endorse each of these steps.

I will begin with the category in which we will make the most fundamental change in nuclear forces in over 40 years, nonstrategic or theater weapons. Last year, I cancelled U.S. plans to modernize our ground-launched theater nuclear weapons. Later, our NATO allies joined us in announcing that the alliance would propose the mutual elimination of all nuclear artillery shells from Europe, as soon as short-range nuclear force negotiations began with the Soviets. But starting these talks now would only perpetuate these systems, while we engage in lengthy negotiations. Last month's events not only permit, but indeed demand swifter, bolder action.

I am therefore directing that the United States eliminate its entire worldwide inventory of ground-launched short-range, that is, theater nuclear weapons. We will bring home and destroy all of our nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic missile warheads. We will, of course, ensure that we preserve an effective air-delivered nuclear capability in Europe. That is essential to NATO's security.

In turn, I have asked the Soviets to go down this road with us, to destroy their entire inventory of ground-launched theater nuclear weapons: not only their nuclear artillery, and nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles, but also the theater systems the U.S. no longer has, systems like nuclear warheads for air-defense missiles, and nuclear land mines.

Recognizing further the major changes in the international military landscape, the United States will withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from its surface ships and attack submarines, as well as those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. This means removing all nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from U.S. ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers. The bottom line is that under normal circumstances, our ships will not carry tactical nuclear weapons.

Many of these land and sea-based warheads will be dismantled and destroyed. Those remaining will be secured in central areas where they would be available if necessary in a future crisis.

Again, there is every reason for the Soviet Union to match our actions: by removing all tactical nuclear weapons from its ships and attack submarines; by withdrawing nuclear weapons for land-based naval aircraft; and by destroying many of them and consolidating what remains at central locations. I urge them to do so.

No category of nuclear weapons has received more attention than those in our strategic arsenals. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, which President Gorbachev and I signed last July was the culmination of almost a decade's work. It calls for substantial stabilizing reductions and effective verification. Prompt ratification by both parties is essential.

But I also believe the time is right to use START as a springboard to achieve additional stabilizing changes.

First, to further reduce tensions, I am directing that all United States strategic bombers immediately stand down from their alert posture. As a comparable gesture, I call upon the Soviet Union to confine its mobile missiles to their garrisons, where they will be safer and more secure.

Second, the United States will immediately stand down from alert all intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for deactivation under START. Rather than waiting for the treaty's reduction plan to run its full 7 year course, we will accelerate elimination of these systems, once START is ratified. I call upon the Soviet Union to do the same.

Third, I am terminating the development of the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM as well as the mobile portions of the small ICBM program. The small single-warhead ICBM will be our only remaining ICBM modernization program. And I call upon the Soviets to terminate any and all programs for future ICBM's with more than one warhead, and to limit ICBM modernization to one type of single warhead missile, just as we have done.

Fourth, I am canceling the current program to build a replacement for the nuclear short-range attack missile for our strategic bombers.

Fifth, as a result of the strategic nuclear weapons adjustments that I've just outlined, the United States will streamline its command and control procedures, allowing us to more effectively manage our strategic nuclear forces.

As the system works now, the Navy commands the submarine part of our strategic deterrent, while the Air Force commands the bomber and land-based elements. But as we reduce our strategic forces, the operational command structure must be as direct as possible. And I have therefore approved the recommendation of Secretary Cheney and the Joint Chiefs to consolidate operational command of these forces into a U.S. strategic command under one commander with participation from both services.

Since the 1970's, the most vulnerable and unstable part of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces has been intercontinental missiles with more than one

warhead. Both sides have these ICBM's in fixed silos in the ground where they are more vulnerable than missiles on submarines.

I propose that the U.S. and the Soviet Union seek early agreement to eliminate from their inventories all ICBM's with multiple warheads. After developing a timetable acceptable to both sides, we could rapidly move to modify or eliminate these systems under procedures already established in the START agreement. In short, such an action would take away the single most unstable part of our nuclear arsenals.

But there is more to do. The United States and the Soviet Union are not the only nations with ballistic missiles. Some 15 nations have them now, and in less than a decade that number could grow to 20. The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf demonstrates in no uncertain terms that the time has come for strong action on this growing threat to world peace.

Accordingly, I am calling on the Soviet leadership to join us in taking immediate concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of nonnuclear defenses to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source, without undermining the credibility of existing deterrent forces. And we will intensify our effort to curb nuclear and missile proliferation. These two efforts will be mutually reinforcing. To foster cooperation, the United States soon will propose additional initiatives in the area of ballistic missile early warning.

Finally, let me discuss yet another opportunity for cooperation that can make our world safer.

During last month's attempted coup in Moscow, many Americans asked me if I thought Soviet nuclear weapons were under adequate control. I do not believe that America was at increased risk of nuclear attack during those tense days. But I do believe more can be done to ensure the safe handling and dismantling of Soviet nuclear weapons. Therefore, I propose that we begin discussions with the Soviet Union to explore cooperation in three areas: First, we should explore joint technical cooperation on the safe and environmentally responsible storage, transportation, dismantling, and destruction of nuclear warheads. Second, we should discuss existing arrangements for the physical security and safety of nuclear weapons and how these might be enhanced. And third, we should discuss nuclear command and control arrangements, and how these might be improved to provide more protection against the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

My friend, French President Mitterrand, offered a similar idea a short while ago. After further consultations with the alliance and when the leadership in

the USSR is ready, we will begin this effort.

The initiatives that I'm announcing build on the new defense strategy that I set out a year ago, one that shifted our focus away from the prospect of global confrontation. We're consulting with our allies on the implementation of many of these steps which fit well with the new post-Cold War strategy and force posture that we've developed in NATO.

As we implement these initiatives we will closely watch how the new Soviet leadership responds. We expect our bold initiatives to meet with equally bold steps on the Soviet side. If this happens, further cooperation is inevitable. If it does not, then an historic opportunity will have been lost. Regardless, let no one doubt we will still retain the necessary strength to protect our security and that of our allies and to respond as necessary.

In addition, regional instabilities, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and as we saw during the conflict in the Gulf, territorial ambitions of power-hungry tyrants, still require us to maintain a strong military to protect our national interests and to honor commitments to our allies.

Therefore, we must implement a coherent plan for a significantly smaller but fully capable military, one that enhances stability but is still sufficient to convince any potential adversary that the cost of aggression would exceed any possible gain.

We can safely afford to take the steps I've announced today, steps that are designed to reduce the dangers of miscalculation in a crisis. But to do so, we must also pursue vigorously those elements of our strategic modernization program that serve the same purpose. We must fully fund the B - 2 and SDI program. We can make radical changes in the nuclear postures of both sides to make them smaller, safer, and more stable. But the United States must maintain modern nuclear forces including the strategic triad and thus ensure the credibility of our deterrent.

Some will say that these initiatives call for a budget windfall for domestic programs. But the peace dividend I seek is not measured in dollars but in greater security. In the near term, some of these steps may even cost money. Given the ambitious plan I have already proposed to reduce U.S. defense spending by 25 percent, we cannot afford to make any unwise or unwarranted cuts in the defense budget that I have submitted to Congress. I am counting on congressional support to ensure we have the funds necessary to restructure our forces prudently and implement the decisions that I have outlined tonight.

Twenty years ago when I had the opportunity to serve this country as Ambassador to the United Nations. I once talked about the vision that was in the minds of the UN's founders, how they dreamed of a new age when the great powers of the world would cooperate in peace as they had as allies in war.

Today I consulted with President Gorbachev. And while he hasn't had time to absorb the details, I believe the Soviet response will clearly be positive. I also spoke with President Yeltsin, and he had a similar reaction, positive, hopeful.

Now, the Soviet people and their leaders can shed the heavy burden of a dangerous and costly nuclear arsenal which has threatened world peace for the past five decades. They can join us in these dramatic moves toward a new world of peace and security.

Tonight, as I see the drama of democracy unfolding around the globe, perhaps we are closer to that new world than ever before. The future is ours to influence, to shape, to mold. While we must not gamble that future, neither can we forfeit the historic opportunity now before us.

It has been said, "Destiny is not a matter of chance. It is a matter of choice. It is not a thing to be waited for. It's a thing to be achieved." The United States has always stood where duty required us to stand. Now let them say that we led where destiny required us to lead, to a more peaceful, hopeful future. We cannot give a more precious gift to the children of the world.

Thank you, good night, and God bless the United States of America.

[Note: President George H.W. Bush spoke at 8:02 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. In his remarks, he referred to Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom; President Francois Mitterrand of France; Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany; Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney; President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union; and President Boris Yeltsin of the Republic of Russia.]

Appendix D

Soviet and Russian Responses to the Bush Initiative

*I. Text of President Gorbachev's Televised Statement on Nuclear Weapons**

October 5, 1991, Saturday, Moscow

Dear compatriots:

A week ago, U.S. President George Bush put forward an important initiative on nuclear weapons. This initiative confirms that new thinking has been widely supported by the world community. George Bush's proposals continue the drive started in Reykjavik. This is my opinion. I know that Boris Yeltsin and leaders of other republics share this opinion.

In this statement, I will announce our reciprocal steps and countermeasures.

First: The following steps will be made as regards tactical nuclear weapons:

- All nuclear artillery ammunition and nuclear warheads for tactical missiles will be destroyed.
- Nuclear warheads of anti-aircraft missiles will be removed from the army and stored in central bases. Part of them will be destroyed. All nuclear mines will be eliminated.
- All tactical nuclear weapons will be removed from surface ships and multipurpose submarines. These weapons, as well as weapons from ground-based naval aviation, will be stored. Part of them will be destroyed.

Thus, the Soviet Union and the United States are taking reciprocal radical measures leading to the elimination of tactical weapons. Moreover, we propose that the United States remove on a reciprocal basis from the Navy and destroy tactical nuclear weapons. Also on a reciprocal basis, we could remove from active units of front (tactical) aviation all nuclear ammunition (bombs and aircraft missiles) and store

* As carried by the Tass news agency: Reprinted from U.P.I. (copyright 1991).

them. The Soviet Union urges other nuclear powers to join these far-reaching Soviet-U.S. measures as regards tactical weapons.

Second: Like the U.S. president, I call for the earliest possible ratification of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons. This issue will be discussed by the first session of the new Soviet Supreme Soviet. Taking into account the unilateral steps on strategic offensive weapons announced by President George Bush, we will take the following measures:

- Our heavy bombers, like U.S. ones, will be removed from alert, and their nuclear weapons will be stored.
- We will stop work on a new modified short-range missile for Soviet heavy bombers.
- The Soviet Union will stop work on a mobile small-size intercontinental ballistic missile.
- We will scrap plans to make new launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles on rail cars and modernize them. Thus, the number of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple individually targeted warheads will not increase.
- All our intercontinental ballistic missiles on rail cars will be returned to their storage.
- We will remove from day-to-day alert status 503 intercontinental ballistic missiles, including 134 intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple individually targeted warheads.
- We have already removed from active forces three nuclear missile submarines with 44 launchers for submarine-based ballistic missiles and three more submarines with 48 launchers are now being removed.

Third: We will make more radical cuts in our strategic offensive weapons than the treaty on strategic offensive weapons envisages. As a result, in seven years, we will have 5,000 nuclear warheads instead of 6,000 envisaged by the treaty. We would welcome reciprocal steps by the United States.

We propose that immediately after the ratification of the treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union begin negotiations on further radical cuts in strategic offensive weapons, approximately by 50 percent. We are ready to discuss U.S. proposals on non-nuclear anti-aircraft systems.

We propose to study the possibility of creating joint systems to avert nuclear missile attacks with ground- and space-based elements.

Fourth: We declare an immediate one-year unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. We hope other nuclear powers will follow this

path toward the earliest possible and full cessation of nuclear testing. We hope to reach an agreement with the United States on a controlled cessation of the production of all fissionable materials for weapons.

Fifth: We are ready to begin a detailed dialogue with the United States on the development of safe and ecologically clean technologies to store and transport nuclear warheads, as well as methods to utilize nuclear explosive devices and increase nuclear safety. To increase the safety of nuclear arms control, we put all strategic nuclear weapons under single control and include strategic defensive systems into a single armed service.

Sixth: We hope that eventually other nuclear powers will follow the example of the United States and the Soviet Union. I believe the time has come for all nuclear powers to make a joint statement to keep them from making a first nuclear strike. The Soviet Union has long adhered to this principle. I am convinced the United States will take a vital step by making such a commitment.

Seventh: We welcome the U.S. plans to reduce its armed forces by 500,000 people. We plan to reduce our armed forces by 700,000 people.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that by taking unilateral and bilateral steps and holding negotiations, we push forward the process of disarmament, approaching the goal proclaimed in early 1986 — a nuclear- free, safer and more stable world. The governments, experts and departments will have much to do in this field. It will be a new stage of international development on one of its major directions.

Therefore, a question about a new Soviet-U.S. summit meeting may naturally emerge. I have just had a conversation with U.S. President George Bush and told him about our reply to his initiative. We had a good discussion. The U.S. president gave a positive assessment of our proposals and expressed satisfaction with our approach toward solving key problems in world politics.

Thank you. All the best to you.

*II. Statement by the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, "On Russia's Policy in the Field of Limiting and Reducing Armaments"**

January 29, 1992, Wednesday

Esteemed citizens of Russia,

My address today is devoted to a question which is of vital importance, namely the practical measures taken by Russia in the field of limiting and reducing armaments. Our position of principle consists in that all nuclear weapons and other mass annihilation weapons in the world must be eliminated. Naturally, this should be carried out gradually and on a parity basis. In this vitally important business we are open to cooperation with all states and international organizations, including cooperation within the United Nations framework.

The measures which I am going to present have been prepared on the basis of regular interaction and coordination with the CIS member states and in line with the agreements reached at the meetings of their leaders in Minsk, Alma-Ata and Moscow. Russia considers itself to be the legal successor of the USSR insofar as responsibility for its international obligations is concerned. We reaffirm all the commitments under bilateral and multilateral agreements on arms limitations and reductions and on disarmament which have been signed by the Soviet Union and are currently in force. The leadership of Russia reaffirms its adherence to the course towards a radical reduction of nuclear armaments, ensuring the maximum security of nuclear weapons and of all objects and installations connected with their development, production and operation. Russia comes out with the initiative to set up an international agency to monitor the reduction of nuclear weapons. Subsequently this agency could gradually extend its control over the entire nuclear cycle — from the extraction of uranium to the production of deuterium and tritium and the burial of nuclear waste.

The measures we are undertaking in the sphere of disarmament do not in any way undermine or weaken the defense capacity of Russia or the CIS member states. We are talking about a reasonable, minimal sufficiency of nuclear and conventional weapons. This is our

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overriding principle in building and maintaining our armed forces. Its implementation will allow us to save considerable resources, which will be channeled towards civilian projects, to address social issues and to implement reforms.

Today conditions have arisen which make it possible to take a number of new major steps towards cutting armaments, some of which we are undertaking unilaterally and others on a reciprocal basis. We are going to take the following steps as a matter of priority.

First. In the field of strategic offensive armaments. A treaty on strategic offensive armaments cuts has been submitted to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation for ratification. The ratification process has already gone under way in the United States. I believe that the enactment of this major document, including its approval by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, must be carried out as soon as possible. But already, prior to the strategic offensive weapons reduction treaty going into effect, Russia has undertaken a number of large-scale measures designed to curtail its strategic arsenals. Thus, approximately 600 strategic ballistic ground- and sea-based missiles, or nearly 1,250 nuclear warheads, have been taken off high alert status. Furthermore, 130 underground inter-continental ballistic missile launching sites have been liquidated or are about to be liquidated. Preparations have been made to dismantle missile launching installations at 6 nuclear submarines. Programs of developing and modernizing several strategic offensive armaments types have been stopped. The strategic nuclear weapons located in Ukraine will be dismantled within a shorter time span than was planned originally. Corresponding agreements have already been reached.

I should like to stress that we are not just talking about our unilateral disarmament. Parallel steps, on a goodwill basis, are being simultaneously taken by the United States of America. Now, however, it is possible and necessary to go still further down this path. Lately a number of relevant decisions has been adopted. We are stopping the production of heavy TU-160 and Tu-95MC bombers and the production of long-range air-based cruise missiles of corresponding types. We are ready, on a mutual basis with the USA, to stop the development and production of new types of these missiles. We are also stopping production of corresponding types of sea-based nuclear cruise missiles. At the same time we are ready, on a reciprocal basis, to liquidate all the existing nuclear long-range sea-based cruise missiles. We are stopping military exercises involving a large number of heavy bombers, which means that not more than 30 such bombers can be engaged in such exercises. The number of nuclear submarines carrying

ballistic missiles on high alert status has been halved and will be reduced still further. We are ready, on a reciprocal basis, to renounce the practice of using such submarines for combat patrol missions. Within a three-year period, instead of the original seven years, Russia will reduce the number of strategic offensive armaments down to a number envisioned under the existing agreement. We shall thus reach a level stipulated by a corresponding treaty four years ahead of schedule. If mutual agreement is reached with the USA, we could move in this direction still further. We propose that strategic offensive armaments that Russia and the USA will have left at their disposal after the reductions, not be targeted at corresponding installations and objects in Russia and the USA. Within the next few days important talks will be held with Western leaders. Proposals have been prepared for new deep cuts of strategic offensive armaments, several-fold, by 2,000-2,500 warheads on each side respectively. We also hope that the other nuclear powers — China, France, Great Britain — will join the process of real nuclear arms reductions.

Second. Tactical nuclear weapons. Large-scale measures for their deep cuts have already been taken, simultaneously with the USA. Lately the production of ground-based nuclear missile warheads has been stopped and also the production of nuclear artillery shells and nuclear mines. The stocks of such nuclear armaments will be destroyed. Russia will eliminate one-third of its sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, and one-half of ground-to-air missile warheads. Steps in this direction have already been taken. We are also determined to halve the stocks of air-borne tactical nuclear weapons. The remaining air-borne tactical nuclear weapons could be, on a mutual basis with the USA, withdrawn and taken out of service from tactical air force units and located at centralized storage depots.

Third. Missile defense and outer space. Russia reaffirms its adherence to the air defense treaty. It is an important factor of maintaining strategic stability in the world. We are ready to continue an objective discussion of the US proposal on reducing non-nuclear air defense systems. Our principle is well known. If this strengthens strategic stability in the world as well as Russia's security, we definitely support this approach. We also announce our readiness to eliminate anti-satellite systems, on a parity basis with the USA, and ban the production of armaments designed to kill satellites. We are ready to work out and operate a joint global defense system in place of the SDI.

Fourth. Nuclear testing and production of fissionable materials for nuclear armaments. Russia is strongly in favor of banning all nuclear tests. Russia adheres to the one-year moratorium on nuclear tests,

announced in October 1991, and we hope that other nuclear powers will also refrain from conducting nuclear tests. The atmosphere of mutual restraint would contribute to reaching agreements on non-conduct of such tests in general, possibly by reducing the number of nuclear tests gradually, on a step-by-step basis. In the interests of ultimately resolving this task we are proposing to the USA to resume bilateral relations on further cuts of nuclear tests. Russia is determined to go ahead with the program of stopping the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. Industrial plutonium-producing facilities will be shut down before the year 2000, some of them ahead of schedule, already in 1993. We reaffirm our proposal to the USA to reach agreement on stopping the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, subject to mutual monitoring and control.

Fifth. Non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles. Russia reaffirms its commitments under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, among other things, as its depository. We hope that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine will join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, as non-nuclear states, together with the other CIS member states. Russia declares its full support for the activity of international atomic energy commission and it favors the necessity of strengthening the effectiveness of its guarantees. We are taking additional steps in order to prevent our exports leading to the proliferation of mass destruction weapons. Work is now under way for Russia to become part of the international atomic commission's comprehensive guarantees system, as a precondition for our exports of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Russia is determined to accede to the international missile and missile technology non-proliferation regime, as an equal partner. We support the efforts of the Australia Group to monitor chemical exports. The Russian Federation intends to pass internal legislation regulating the export from Russia of materials, equipment and technologies of dual application which could be used to create nuclear chemical or biological weapons or combat missiles. A comprehensive state monitoring and control system is being created to supervise such exports. We shall be working in close coordination and cooperation with all CIS member states on these matters. Russia supports the basic principles regulating weapons sales, adopted in London in October 1991.

Sixth. Conventional armaments. The conventional forces in Europe treaty has been presented to the Russian Parliament for approval. Other CIS member states whose territory is covered by this treaty also attach great importance to its immediate ratification. Russia reaffirms its intention to reduce, jointly with other CIS member states, the Armed Forces of the former USSR by 700,000 men. Russia attaches great

importance to the negotiations currently under way in Vienna on reductions of military personnel and confidence-building measures and also to new negotiations on cooperation and security in Europe. The latter could become a standing all-European forum in searching for ways of creating a collective European security system. Russia, in collaboration with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, will work towards reaching agreement with China in within the framework of negotiations on reductions of armed forces and armaments in border areas. A decision has been adopted not to conduct in 1992 large-scale military exercises involving more than 13,000 personnel, not only in the European but also in the Asian part of the CIS territory. We also hope that there is a good opportunity to sign an open skies agreement within the very near future.

Seventh. Chemical weapons. We are in favor of a speedy global convention on banning chemical weapons being signed, already in 1992. It is necessary in order to close off all channels to acquisition of chemical weapons without any detriment to the legitimate economic interests of its signatories. Russia adheres to the agreement signed with the USA in 1990 on non-production and elimination of chemical weapons. However it is necessary to somewhat correct and adjust the time frame for their elimination envisioned under this treaty. All the nuclear weapons of the former USSR are currently located in Russia's territory, and Russia assumes full responsibility for their destruction. We are preparing a corresponding state program. We are open to cooperation in this sphere with the USA and other countries concerned.

Eighth. Biological weapons. Russia supports a strict implementation of the 1972 convention on banning biological weapons and the creation on a multilateral basis of respective monitoring and supervisory mechanisms and confidence-building measures. Taking into account the fact that there is a certain lagging behind in the implementation of this convention, I hereby state that Russia abandons that part of reservations that concerned the possibility of retaliatory uses of biological weapons. They were made by the USSR to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on banning chemical and bacteriological weapons in warfare.

Ninth. The defense budget. Russia will continue its line towards drastic reductions of its military budget, orienting it towards civilian purposes and needs. In 1990-1991 defense expenditures, in comparable prices, were already reduced by 20 percent, including a 30 percent cut in expenditures for procurement of armaments and military equipment. In 1992 we are planning to cut our military budget by another 10 percent, in 1991 prices, while the volume of weapons procurement in 1992, in comparison with the previous year, will be nearly halved.

Tenth. Conversion. Russia welcomes international cooperation in the field of converting military production to civilian purposes, and it comes out in favor of expanding this cooperation. For our part we shall encourage this cooperation by providing most favorable conditions and granting tax exemptions and other privileges to corresponding joint ventures and projects.

Esteemed citizens of Russia. I have just outlined a plan of action of the Russian Federation in the field of arms reductions and disarmament. I hope that it will receive your support and approval and that it will also meet with the understanding of all peoples of the Commonwealth of Independent States. I am convinced that it fully corresponds to the interests of this country and the interests of other states in the world. If we implement it, our life will become not only more secure and tranquil, but also more beneficial in material terms.

Just a few hours ago the President of the United States Mr. Bush has delivered his State of the Union message to the American people, proposing to cut nuclear potentials. We have been working in constant contact and consultation with the United States on these matters, and we are also conducting dialogue on the practical implementation of this line and the proposed initiatives. The positions of both sides are very close. Hence lies the guarantee of success in further progress down the path of nuclear arms reductions. Thank you very much.

Appendix E

NATO's New Strategic Concept, 1991^{*}

The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council

Rome, 8 November 1991

At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO's Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognised that the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set in hand a fundamental strategic review. The resulting new Strategic Concept is set out below.

Part I - the Strategic Context

The new strategic environment

1. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe which have radically improved the security environment in which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. The USSR's former satellites have fully recovered their sovereignty. The Soviet Union and its Republics are undergoing radical change. The three Baltic Republics have regained their independence. Soviet forces have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are due to complete their withdrawal from Poland and Germany by 1994. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have, in varying degrees, embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and a market economy. The political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome.

2. In the West, there have also been significant changes. Germany has been united and remains a full member of the Alliance and of European

^{*} Text from NATO on-line library at
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b911108a.htm>.

institutions. The fact that the countries of the European Community are working towards the goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity, and the enhancement of the role of the WEU are important factors for European security. The strengthening of the security dimension in the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the role and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive and mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.

3. Substantial progress in arms control has already enhanced stability and security by lowering arms levels and increasing military transparency and mutual confidence (including through the Stockholm CDE agreement of 1986, the INF Treaty of 1987 and the CSCE agreements and confidence and security-building measures of 1990). Implementation of the 1991 START Treaty will lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced reductions in the field of strategic nuclear arms. Further far-reaching changes and reductions in the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union will be pursued following President Bush's September 1991 initiative. Also of great importance is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed at the 1990 Paris Summit; its implementation will remove the Alliance's numerical inferiority in key conventional weapon systems and provide for effective verification procedures. All these developments will also result in an unprecedented degree of military transparency in Europe, thus increasing predictability and mutual confidence. Such transparency would be further enhanced by the achievement of an Open Skies regime. There are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the achievement of a global ban on chemical weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilising arms exports and the proliferation of certain weapons technologies.

4. The CSCE process, which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly to overcoming the division of Europe. As a result of the Paris Summit, it now includes new institutional arrangements and provides a contractual framework for consultation and cooperation that can play a constructive role, complementary to that of NATO and the process of European integration, in preserving peace.

5. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfillment of a number of objectives set out in the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall security of the Allies. The monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared.

On the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.

6. The new Strategic Concept looks forward to a security environment in which the positive changes referred to above have come to fruition. In particular, it assumes both the completion of the planned withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the full implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The implementation of the Strategic Concept will thus be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment and in particular progress in fulfilling these assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.

Security challenges and risks

7. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.

8. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved. These risks can arise in various ways.

9. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.

10. In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.

11. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non- adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance.
12. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks.
13. From the point of view of Alliance strategy, these different risks have to be seen in different ways. Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major conflict in Europe. On the other hand, there is a greater risk of different crises arising, which could develop quickly and would require a rapid response, but they are likely to be of a lesser magnitude.
14. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.

Part II - Alliance Objectives and security functions

The purpose of the Alliance

15. NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just

and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.

The nature of the Alliance

16. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

17. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realise their essential national security objectives.

18. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.

The fundamental tasks of the Alliance

19. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

20. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

- (i) To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

- (ii) To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
- (iii) To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
- (iv) To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

21. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

22. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.

Part III - A broad approach to security

Protecting peace in a new Europe

23. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, through both political and military means. This comprehensive approach remains the basis of the Alliance's security policy.

24. But what is new is that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.

25. The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and cooperation, underpinned by its commitment to an effective collective defence capability, seeks to reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.

26. In this regard, the Alliance's arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to dialogue and to cooperation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that defence and arms control and disarmament objectives remain in harmony.

27. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security functions, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this respect, it recognises the valuable contribution being made by other organisations such as the European Community and the CSCE, and that the roles of these institutions and of the Alliance are complementary.

Dialogue

28. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic liaison and military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London Declaration. The Alliance will further promote dialogue through regular diplomatic liaison, including an intensified exchange of views and information on security policy issues. Through such means the Allies, individually and collectively, will seek to make full use of the unprecedented opportunities afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and encourage greater mutual understanding of respective security concerns, to increase transparency and predictability in security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least through intensified military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance's pursuit of dialogue will provide a foundation for greater cooperation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful means.

Cooperation

29. The Allies are also committed to pursue cooperation with all states in Europe on the basis of the principles set out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all relevant fields of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other nations in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This policy of cooperation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.

Collective Defence

30. The political approach to security will thus become increasingly important. Nonetheless, the military dimension remains essential. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, is required in order to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that dialogue and cooperation can be undertaken with confidence and achieve their desired results.

Management of crisis and conflict prevention

31. In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance are less predictable than before.

32. In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and coordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field. Close control by the political authorities of the Alliance will be applied from the outset and

at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this end.

33. The potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play.

Part IV - Guidelines for defence

Principles of Alliance Strategy

34. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus requires a broad approach to security. The transformed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to change a number of important features of its military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, it was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised force posture responding to the changed circumstances.

35. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence, and it does not consider itself to be anyone's adversary. The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies must therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.

36. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. As the process of developing a European security identity and defence role progresses, and is reflected

in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defence of Europe.

37. The collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated military structure as well as on cooperation and coordination agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation.

38. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a significantly reduced level. Both elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the other. Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick or easy victory, or territorial gains, by conventional means. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

The Alliance's new force posture

39. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of forward defence towards a reduced forward presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The changes stemming from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now facing the Alliance enable significant modifications to be made in the missions of the Allies' military forces and in their posture.

The missions of Alliance Military Forces

40. The primary role of Alliance military forces, to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states, remains unchanged. But this role must take account of the new strategic environment, in which a single massive and global threat has given way to diverse and

multi-directional risks. Alliance forces have different functions to perform in peace, crisis and war.

41. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members; to contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can contribute to dialogue and cooperation throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements. Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions.

42. In the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security, and thereby contribute to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for measured and timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to deter action against any Ally and, in the event that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it as well as to re-establish the territorial integrity of member states.

43. While in the new security environment a general war in Europe has become highly unlikely, it cannot finally be ruled out. The Alliance's military forces, which have as their fundamental mission to protect peace, have to provide the essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces already described.

Guidelines for the Alliance's force posture

44. To implement its security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment, the organisation of the Allies' forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace. The posture of Allies' forces will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.

45. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will continue to reflect its strictly defensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment including arms control agreements. This means in particular:

- that the overall size of the Allies' forces, and in many cases their readiness, will be reduced;

- that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture in the central region will no longer be required. The peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including where necessary forward deployment of appropriate forces. Regional considerations and, in particular, geostrategic differences within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, including the shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions will be subject compared with the central region and, in the southern region, the potential for instability and the military capabilities in the adjacent areas.

46. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies' forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for augmentation when necessary. For these reasons:

- Available forces will include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a wide range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limited attack and, if required, to defend the territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long warning time.
- The forces of the Allies will be structured so as to permit their military capability to be built up when necessary. This ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including the possibility - albeit unlikely, but one that prudence dictates should not be ruled out - of a major conflict. Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of critical importance.
- Appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and discriminately, will be developed to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime.
- In the event of use of forces, including the deployment of reaction and other available reinforcing forces as an instrument of crisis management, the Alliance's political authorities will, as before, exercise close control over their

employment at all stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed in the light of the new missions and posture of Alliance forces.

Characteristics of conventional forces

47. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfil their functions in peace, crisis and war in a way appropriate to the new security environment. This will be reflected in force and equipment levels; readiness and availability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all of which will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces of the Allies will include, in addition to immediate and rapid reaction forces, main defence forces, which will provide the bulk of forces needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and the unimpeded use of their lines of communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a means of reinforcing existing forces in a particular region. Main defence and augmentation forces will comprise both active and mobilisable elements.

48. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to cooperate closely and combine and assist each other in operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These forces will consist of the following:

- Ground forces, which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will normally be at lower states of readiness and, overall, there will be a greater reliance on mobilisation and reserves. All categories of ground forces will require demonstrable combat effectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced capability for flexible deployment.
- Maritime forces, which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance's crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.
- Air forces, whose ability to fulfil their fundamental roles in both independent air and combined operations - counter-air, air interdiction and offensive air support - as well as to contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations, is essential to the overall effectiveness of the Allies' military forces. Their role in supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriate long-distance airlift and air refuelling capabilities. Air defence forces, including modern air command and control systems, are required to ensure a secure air defence environment.

49. In light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction should be given special consideration. Solution of this problem will require complementary approaches including, for example, export control and missile defences.

50. Alliance strategy is not dependent on a chemical warfare capability. The Allies remain committed to the earliest possible achievement of a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. But, even after implementation of a global ban, precautions of a purely defensive nature will need to be maintained.

51. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future, the ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly important for the achievement of the missions of the Allies' forces. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure, including multinational forces, plays the key role, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multi-national European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence. Allies' efforts to achieve maximum cooperation will be based on the common guidelines for defence defined above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary mutual transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity and the Alliance.

52. In order to be able to respond flexibly to a wide range of possible contingencies, the Allies concerned will require effective surveillance and intelligence, flexible command and control, mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics capabilities, including transport capacities. Logistic stocks must be sufficient to sustain all types of forces in order to permit effective defence until resupply is available. The capability of the Allies concerned to build up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level appropriate to any risk to Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This capability will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the Allies and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Elements of all three force categories will be capable of being employed flexibly as part of both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. Proper use of these capabilities will require control of the necessary lines of communication as well as appropriate support and exercise arrangements. Civil resources will be of increasing relevance in this context.

53. For the Allies concerned, collective defence arrangements will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national

commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the European pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions.

Characteristics of nuclear forces

54. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

55. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.

56. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including conventional force levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence will significantly improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore even more remote. They can therefore significantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear forces. They will maintain adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear

forces, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual capable aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines. There is no requirement for nuclear artillery or ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles and they will be eliminated.

Part V - Conclusion

57. This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance's security policy is based on dialogue; cooperation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful order.

58. The Allies will continue to pursue vigorously further progress in arms control and confidence-building measures with the objective of enhancing security and stability. They will also play an active part in promoting dialogue and cooperation between states on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.

59. NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments in the politico-military environment, including progress in the moves towards a European security identity, and in any changes in the risks to Alliance security. For the Allies concerned, the Strategic Concept will form the basis for the further development of the Alliance's defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence planning arrangements.

Appendix F

Helsinki Agreement on START III, 1997*

Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces

Helsinki, Finland, 21 March 1997

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin underscore that, with the end of the Cold War, major progress has been achieved with regard to strengthening strategic stability and nuclear security. Both the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their nuclear forces. Important steps have been taken to de-target strategic missiles. The Start I Treaty has entered into force, and its implementation is ahead of schedule. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are nuclear weapon free. The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty was indefinitely extended on May 11, 1995 and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed by both the United States and Russia on September 24, 1996.

In another historic step to promote international peace and security, President Clinton and President Yeltsin hereby reaffirm their commitment to take further concrete steps to reduce the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security. The Presidents have reached an understanding on further reductions in and limitations on strategic offensive arms that will substantially reduce the roles and risks of nuclear weapons as we move forward into the next century. Recognizing the fundamental significance of the ABM Treaty for these objectives, the Presidents have, in a separate joint statement, given instructions on demarcation between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which will allow for deployment of effective theater missile defenses and prevent circumvention of the ABM Treaty.

With the foregoing in mind, President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings.

- Once Start II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a Start III agreement, which will include, among other things, the following basic components:
- Establishment, by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties.

* Text from the Arms Control Association at <http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/MARCH/js.html>.

- Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.
- Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.
- Placement in a deactivated status of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003, by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps. The United States is providing assistance through the Nunn Lugar program to facilitate early deactivation.

The Presidents have reached an understanding that the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty will be extended to December 31, 2007. The sides will agree on specific language to be submitted to the Duma and, following Duma approval of START II, to be submitted to the United States Senate.

In this context, the Presidents underscore the importance of prompt ratification of the START II Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

The Presidents also agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long range sea launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence building and transparency measures.

Taking into account all the understandings outlined above, and recalling their statement of May 10, 1995, the Presidents agreed the sides will also consider the issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

Appendix G

NATO's New Strategic Concept, 1999*

The Alliance's Strategic Concept

**Approved by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C.
on 23rd and 24th April 1999**

Introduction

1. At their Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, NATO Heads of State and Government approved the Alliance's new Strategic Concept.
2. NATO has successfully ensured the freedom of its members and prevented war in Europe during the 40 years of the Cold War. By combining defence with dialogue, it played an indispensable role in bringing East-West confrontation to a peaceful end. The dramatic changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic landscape brought by the end of the Cold War were reflected in the Alliance's 1991 Strategic Concept. There have, however, been further profound political and security developments since then.
3. The dangers of the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks. A new Europe of greater integration is emerging, and a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part. The Alliance has been at the heart of efforts to establish new patterns of cooperation and mutual understanding across the Euro-Atlantic region and has committed itself to essential new activities in the interest of a wider stability. It has shown the depth of that commitment in its efforts to put an end to the immense human suffering created by conflict in the Balkans. The years since the end of the Cold War have also witnessed important developments in arms control, a process to which the Alliance is fully committed. The Alliance's role in these positive developments has been underpinned by the comprehensive adaptation of its approach to security and of its procedures and structures. The last ten years

* Text from NATO on-line library at
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.

have also seen, however, the appearance of complex new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

4. The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges. It has, therefore, a demanding agenda. It must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range of its missions.
5. This new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance as it pursues this agenda. It expresses NATO's enduring purpose and nature and its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces.

Part I - The Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance

6. NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region.
7. The Alliance embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.
8. The fundamental guiding principle by which the Alliance works is that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance, through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres, ensure that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without

- depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to realise their essential national security objectives.
9. The resulting sense of equal security among the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities, contributes to stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance does not seek these benefits for its members alone, but is committed to the creation of conditions conducive to increased partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with others who share its broad political objectives.
 10. To achieve its essential purpose, as an Alliance of nations committed to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:
 - Security: To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force.
 - Consultation: To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, as an essential transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
 - Deterrence and Defence: To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area:

 - Crisis Management: To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations.
 - Partnership: To promote wide-ranging partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the aim of increasing transparency, mutual confidence and the capacity for joint action with the Alliance.
 11. In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic

institutions. The Alliance does not consider itself to be any country's adversary.

Part II - Strategic Perspectives

The Evolving Strategic Environment

12. The Alliance operates in an environment of continuing change. Developments in recent years have been generally positive, but uncertainties and risks remain which can develop into acute crises. Within this evolving context, NATO has played an essential part in strengthening Euro-Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War. Its growing political role; its increased political and military partnership, cooperation and dialogue with other states, including with Russia, Ukraine and Mediterranean Dialogue countries; its continuing openness to the accession of new members; its collaboration with other international organisations; its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through peace support operations: all reflect its determination to shape its security environment and enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.
13. In parallel, NATO has successfully adapted to enhance its ability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Internal reform has included a new command structure, including the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, the creation of arrangements to permit the rapid deployment of forces for the full range of the Alliance's missions, and the building of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance.
14. The United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the Western European Union (WEU) have made distinctive contributions to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. Mutually reinforcing organisations have become a central feature of the security environment.
15. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.
16. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement, is the most inclusive security organisation in Europe, which also includes Canada and the United States, and plays an essential role in promoting peace and stability, enhancing cooperative security, and advancing democracy and human rights in Europe. The OSCE is particularly

active in the fields of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. NATO and the OSCE have developed close practical cooperation, especially with regard to the international effort to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia.

17. The European Union has taken important decisions and given a further impetus to its efforts to strengthen its security and defence dimension. This process will have implications for the entire Alliance, and all European Allies should be involved in it, building on arrangements developed by NATO and the WEU. The development of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) includes the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Such a policy, as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty. Important steps taken in this context include the incorporation of the WEU's Petersberg tasks into the Treaty on European Union and the development of closer institutional relations with the WEU.
18. As stated in the 1994 Summit declaration and reaffirmed in Berlin in 1996, the Alliance fully supports the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance by making available its assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. To this end, the Alliance and the WEU have developed a close relationship and put into place key elements of the ESDI as agreed in Berlin. In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defence enhances the security environment of the Alliance.
19. The stability, transparency, predictability, lower levels of armaments, and verification which can be provided by arms control and non-proliferation agreements support NATO's political and military efforts to achieve its strategic objectives. The Allies have played a major part in the significant achievements in this field. These include the enhanced stability produced by the CFE Treaty, the deep reductions in nuclear weapons provided for in the START treaties; the signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the accession to it of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as non-nuclear weapons states, and the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Ottawa Convention to ban anti-personnel landmines and similar agreements make an important contribution to alleviating human suffering. There are welcome prospects for further advances in

arms control in conventional weapons and with respect to nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) weapons.

Security challenges and risks

20. Notwithstanding positive developments in the strategic environment and the fact that large-scale conventional aggression against the Alliance is highly unlikely, the possibility of such a threat emerging over the longer term exists. The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.
21. The existence of powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance also constitutes a significant factor which the Alliance has to take into account if security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area are to be maintained.
22. The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery remains a matter of serious concern. In spite of welcome progress in strengthening international non-proliferation regimes, major challenges with respect to proliferation remain. The Alliance recognises that proliferation can occur despite efforts to prevent it and can pose a direct military threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. Some states, including on NATO's periphery and in other regions, sell or acquire or try to acquire NBC weapons and delivery means. Commodities and technology that could be used to build these weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means are becoming more common, while detection and prevention of illicit trade in these materials and know-how continues to be difficult. Non-state actors have shown the potential to create and use some of these weapons.
23. The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons may result in the greater availability of sophisticated military capabilities, permitting adversaries to acquire highly capable offensive and defensive air, land, and sea-

borne systems, cruise missiles, and other advanced weaponry. In addition, state and non-state adversaries may try to exploit the Alliance's growing reliance on information systems through information operations designed to disrupt such systems. They may attempt to use strategies of this kind to counter NATO's superiority in traditional weaponry.

24. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.

Part III - The Approach to Security in the 21st Century

25. The Alliance is committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach forms the basis for the Alliance to accomplish its fundamental security tasks effectively, and its increasing effort to develop effective cooperation with other European and Euro-Atlantic organisations as well as the United Nations. Our collective aim is to build a European security architecture in which the Alliance's contribution to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and the contribution of these other international organisations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, both in deepening relations among Euro-Atlantic countries and in managing crises. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.
26. The Alliance seeks to preserve peace and to reinforce Euro-Atlantic security and stability by: the preservation of the transatlantic link; the maintenance of effective military capabilities sufficient for deterrence and defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions; the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance; an overall capability to manage crises successfully; its continued openness to new

members; and the continued pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with other nations as part of its co-operative approach to Euro-Atlantic security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The Transatlantic Link

27. NATO is committed to a strong and dynamic partnership between Europe and North America in support of the values and interests they share. The security of Europe and that of North America are indivisible. Thus the Alliance's commitment to the indispensable transatlantic link and the collective defence of its members is fundamental to its credibility and to the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

The Maintenance Of Alliance Military Capabilities

28. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity, remains at the core of the Alliance's ability to prevent any attempt at coercion or intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed against the Alliance can never be perceived as an option with any prospect of success.
29. Military capabilities effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through non-Article 5 crisis response operations. These missions can be highly demanding and can place a premium on the same political and military qualities, such as cohesion, multinational training, and extensive prior planning, that would be essential in an Article 5 situation. Accordingly, while they may pose special requirements, they will be handled through a common set of Alliance structures and procedures.

The European Security And Defence Identity

30. The Alliance, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members and through which common security objectives will be pursued wherever possible, remains committed to a balanced and dynamic transatlantic partnership. The European Allies have taken decisions to enable them to assume greater responsibilities in the security and defence field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area and thus the security of all Allies. On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance, in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defence

Identity will continue to be developed within NATO. This process will require close cooperation between NATO, the WEU and, if and when appropriate, the European Union. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; it will reinforce the transatlantic partnership; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.

Conflict Prevention And Crisis Management

31. In pursuit of its policy of preserving peace, preventing war, and enhancing security and stability and as set out in the fundamental security tasks, NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organisations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's preparedness to carry out such operations supports the broader objective of reinforcing and extending stability and often involves the participation of NATO's Partners. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. In this context NATO recalls its subsequent decisions with respect to crisis response operations in the Balkans. Taking into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion, participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.
32. NATO will make full use of partnership, cooperation and dialogue and its links to other organisations to contribute to preventing crises and, should they arise, defusing them at an early stage. A coherent approach to crisis management, as in any use of force by the Alliance, will require the Alliance's political authorities to choose and co-ordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and military measures and to exercise close political control at all stages.

Partnership, Cooperation, And Dialogue

33. Through its active pursuit of partnership, cooperation, and dialogue, the Alliance is a positive force in promoting security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Through outreach and openness, the Alliance seeks to preserve peace, support and promote democracy, contribute to prosperity and progress, and foster genuine partnership with and among all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries. This aims at enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict.
34. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will remain the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO's cooperation with its Partners. It offers an expanded political dimension for both consultation and cooperation. EAPC consultations build increased transparency and confidence among its members on security issues, contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management, and develop practical cooperation activities, including in civil emergency planning, and scientific and environmental affairs.
35. The Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners and for enhancing interoperability between Partners and NATO. Through detailed programmes that reflect individual Partners' capacities and interests, Allies and Partners work towards transparency in national defence planning and budgeting; democratic control of defence forces; preparedness for civil disasters and other emergencies; and the development of the ability to work together, including in NATO-led PfP operations. The Alliance is committed to increasing the role the Partners play in PfP decision-making and planning, and making PfP more operational. NATO has undertaken to consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.
36. Russia plays a unique role in Euro-Atlantic security. Within the framework of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, NATO and Russia have committed themselves to developing their relations on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency to achieve a lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area based on the principles of democracy and co-operative security. NATO and Russia have agreed to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe. A strong, stable and enduring partnership between NATO and Russia is essential to achieve lasting stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

37. Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment and is an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic values. NATO is committed to further strengthening its distinctive partnership with Ukraine on the basis of the NATO-Ukraine Charter, including political consultations on issues of common concern and a broad range of practical cooperation activities. The Alliance continues to support Ukrainian sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, democratic development, economic prosperity and its status as a non-nuclear weapons state as key factors of stability and security in central and eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole.
38. The Mediterranean is an area of special interest to the Alliance. Security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue process is an integral part of NATO's co-operative approach to security. It provides a framework for confidence building, promotes transparency and cooperation in the region, and reinforces and is reinforced by other international efforts. The Alliance is committed to developing progressively the political, civil, and military aspects of the Dialogue with the aim of achieving closer cooperation with, and more active involvement by, countries that are partners in this Dialogue.

Enlargement

39. The Alliance remains open to new members under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. It expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European security and stability. To this end, NATO has established a programme of activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership in the context of its wider relationship with them. No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration.

Arms Control, Disarmament, And Non-Proliferation

40. The Alliance's policy of support for arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. The Allies seek to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with the Alliance's ability to provide for

collective defence and to fulfil the full range of its missions. The Alliance will continue to ensure that - as an important part of its broad approach to security - defence and arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation objectives remain in harmony. The Alliance will continue to actively contribute to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as to confidence and security building measures. The Allies take seriously their distinctive role in promoting a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable international arms control and disarmament process. The Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The principal non-proliferation goal of the Alliance and its members is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means. The Alliance attaches great importance to the continuing validity and the full implementation by all parties of the CFE Treaty as an essential element in ensuring the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.

Part IV - Guidelines for the Alliance's Forces

Principles Of Alliance Strategy

41. The Alliance will maintain the necessary military capabilities to accomplish the full range of NATO's missions. The principles of Allied solidarity and strategic unity remain paramount for all Alliance missions. Alliance forces must safeguard NATO's military effectiveness and freedom of action. The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. With respect to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the combined military forces of the Alliance must be capable of deterring any potential aggression against it, of stopping an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible should an attack nevertheless occur, and of ensuring the political independence and territorial integrity of its member states. They must also be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations. The Alliance's forces have essential roles in fostering cooperation and understanding with NATO's Partners and other states, particularly in helping Partners to prepare for potential participation in NATO-led PfP operations. Thus they contribute to the preservation of peace, to the safeguarding of common security interests of Alliance members, and to the maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. By deterring the use of NBC weapons, they

- contribute to Alliance efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of these weapons and their delivery means.
42. The achievement of the Alliance's aims depends critically on the equitable sharing of the roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence. The presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. The North American Allies contribute to the Alliance through military forces available for Alliance missions, through their broader contribution to international peace and security, and through the provision of unique training facilities on the North American continent. The European Allies also make wide-ranging and substantial contributions. As the process of developing the ESDI within the Alliance progresses, the European Allies will further enhance their contribution to the common defence and to international peace and stability including through multinational formations.
 43. The principle of collective effort in Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements also enable NATO's forces to carry out non-Article 5 crisis response operations and constitute a prerequisite for a coherent Alliance response to all possible contingencies. They are based on procedures for consultation, an integrated military structure, and on co-operation agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common funding; common operational planning; multinational formations, headquarters and command arrangements; an integrated air defence system; a balance of roles and responsibilities among the Allies; the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory when required; arrangements, including planning, for crisis management and reinforcement; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined doctrines and exercises when appropriate; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation. The inclusion of NATO's Partners in such arrangements or the development of similar arrangements for them, in appropriate areas, is also instrumental in enhancing cooperation and common efforts in Euro-Atlantic security matters.
 44. Multinational funding, including through the Military Budget and the NATO Security Investment Programme, will continue to play an important role in acquiring and maintaining necessary assets and capabilities. The management of resources should be guided by the military requirements of the Alliance as they evolve.

45. The Alliance supports the further development of the ESDI within the Alliance, including by being prepared to make available assets and capabilities for operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed.
46. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But the Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.

The Alliance's Force Posture

The Missions of Alliance Military Forces

47. The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance's forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and - in case of conflict - to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.
48. The maintenance of the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area is of key importance. An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises which jeopardise Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organisations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security.
49. In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance's forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defence missions. Well-trained and well-equipped forces at

adequate levels of readiness and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in providing efficient military contributions. The Alliance should also be prepared to support, on the basis of separable but not separate capabilities, operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed. The potential participation of Partners and other non-NATO nations in NATO-led operations as well as possible operations with Russia would be further valuable elements of NATO's contribution to managing crises that affect Euro-Atlantic security.

50. Alliance military forces also contribute to promoting stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area by their participation in military-to-military contacts and in other cooperation activities and exercises under the Partnership for Peace as well as those organised to deepen NATO's relationships with Russia, Ukraine and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. They contribute to stability and understanding by participating in confidence-building activities, including those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements and in humanitarian de-mining. Key areas of consultation and cooperation could include inter alia: training and exercises, interoperability, civil-military relations, concept and doctrine development, defence planning, crisis management, proliferation issues, armaments cooperation as well as participation in operational planning and operations.

Guidelines for the Alliance's Force Posture

51. To implement the Alliance's fundamental security tasks and the principles of its strategy, the forces of the Alliance must continue to be adapted to meet the requirements of the full range of Alliance missions effectively and to respond to future challenges. The posture of Allies' forces, building on the strengths of different national defence structures, will conform to the guidelines developed in the following paragraphs.
52. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will reflect its commitment to collective defence and to conduct crisis response operations, sometimes at short notice, distant from their home stations, including beyond the Allies' territory. The characteristics of the Alliance's forces will also reflect the provisions of relevant arms control agreements. Alliance forces must be adequate in strength and capabilities to deter and counter aggression against any Ally. They must be interoperable and have appropriate doctrines and technologies. They must be held at the required readiness and deployability, and

be capable of military success in a wide range of complex joint and combined operations, which may also include Partners and other non-NATO nations.

53. This means in particular:
 - a. that the overall size of the Allies' forces will be kept at the lowest levels consistent with the requirements of collective defence and other Alliance missions; they will be held at appropriate and graduated readiness;
 - b. that the peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence throughout the territory of the Alliance, including the stationing and deployment of forces outside home territory and waters and forward deployment of forces when and where necessary. Regional and, in particular, geostrategic considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, as instabilities on NATO's periphery could lead to crises or conflicts requiring an Alliance military response, potentially with short warning times;
 - c. that NATO's command structure will be able to undertake command and control of the full range of the Alliance's military missions including through the use of deployable combined and joint HQs, in particular CJTF headquarters, to command and control multinational and multiservice forces. It will also be able to support operations under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, thereby contributing to the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, and to conduct NATO-led non-Article 5 crisis response operations in which Partners and other countries may participate;
 - d. that overall, the Alliance will, in both the near and long term and for the full range of its missions, require essential operational capabilities such as an effective engagement capability; deployability and mobility; survivability of forces and infrastructure; and sustainability, incorporating logistics and force rotation. To develop these capabilities to their full potential for multinational operations, interoperability, including human factors, the use of appropriate advanced technology, the maintenance of information superiority in military operations, and highly qualified personnel with a broad spectrum of skills will be important. Sufficient capabilities in the areas of command, control and communications as well as intelligence and surveillance will serve as necessary force multipliers;
 - e. that at any time a limited but militarily significant proportion of ground, air and sea forces will be able to react as rapidly as

necessary to a wide range of eventualities, including a short-notice attack on any Ally. Greater numbers of force elements will be available at appropriate levels of readiness to sustain prolonged operations, whether within or beyond Alliance territory, including through rotation of deployed forces. Taken together, these forces must also be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to contribute to deterrence and to defend against limited attacks on the Alliance;

- f. that the Alliance must be able to build up larger forces, both in response to any fundamental changes in the security environment and for limited requirements, by reinforcement, by mobilising reserves, or by reconstituting forces when necessary. This ability must be in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including potential long-term developments. It must take into account the possibility of substantial improvements in the readiness and capabilities of military forces on the periphery of the Alliance. Capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within and from Europe and North America will remain of critical importance, with a resulting need for a high degree of deployability, mobility and flexibility;
- g. that appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, deploy and draw down forces quickly and selectively, are necessary to permit measured, flexible and timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in peacetime;
- h. that the Alliance's defence posture must have the capability to address appropriately and effectively the risks associated with the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery, which also pose a potential threat to the Allies' populations, territory, and forces. A balanced mix of forces, response capabilities and strengthened defences is needed;
- i. that the Alliance's forces and infrastructure must be protected against terrorist attacks.

Characteristics of Conventional Forces

- 54. It is essential that the Allies' military forces have a credible ability to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions. This requirement has implications for force structures, force and equipment levels; readiness, availability, and sustainability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up and mobilisation capabilities. The aim should be to achieve an optimum balance between high readiness forces capable of beginning rapidly, and immediately as necessary, collective

defence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations; forces at different levels of lower readiness to provide the bulk of those required for collective defence, for rotation of forces to sustain crisis response operations, or for further reinforcement of a particular region; and a longer-term build-up and augmentation capability for the worst case -- but very remote -- scenario of large scale operations for collective defence. A substantial proportion of Alliance forces will be capable of performing more than one of these roles.

55. Alliance forces will be structured to reflect the multinational and joint nature of Alliance missions. Essential tasks will include controlling, protecting, and defending territory; ensuring the unimpeded use of sea, air, and land lines of communication; sea control and protecting the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based deterrent; conducting independent and combined air operations; ensuring a secure air environment and effective extended air defence; surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance and electronic warfare; strategic lift; and providing effective and flexible command and control facilities, including deployable combined and joint headquarters.
56. The Alliance's defence posture against the risks and potential threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including through work on missile defences. As NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond NATO's borders, capabilities for dealing with proliferation risks must be flexible, mobile, rapidly deployable and sustainable. Doctrines, planning, and training and exercise policies must also prepare the Alliance to deter and defend against the use of NBC weapons. The aim in doing so will be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.
57. Alliance strategy does not include a chemical or biological warfare capability. The Allies support universal adherence to the relevant disarmament regimes. But, even if further progress with respect to banning chemical and biological weapons can be achieved, defensive precautions will remain essential.
58. Given reduced overall force levels and constrained resources, the ability to work closely together will remain vital for achieving the Alliance's missions. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure plays the key role, are essential in this regard. The various strands of NATO's defence planning need to be effectively coordinated at all levels in order to ensure the preparedness of the forces and supporting structures to carry out the full spectrum of

- their roles. Exchanges of information among the Allies about their force plans contribute to securing the availability of the capabilities needed for the execution of these roles. Consultations in case of important changes in national defence plans also remain of key importance. Cooperation in the development of new operational concepts will be essential for responding to evolving security challenges. The detailed practical arrangements that have been developed as part of the ESDI within the Alliance contribute to close allied co-operation without unnecessary duplication of assets and capabilities.
59. To be able to respond flexibly to possible contingencies and to permit the effective conduct of Alliance missions, the Alliance requires sufficient logistics capabilities, including transport capacities, medical support and stocks to deploy and sustain all types of forces effectively. Standardisation will foster cooperation and cost-effectiveness in providing logistic support to allied forces. Mounting and sustaining operations outside the Allies' territory, where there may be little or no host-nation support, will pose special logistical challenges. The ability to build-up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces, in a timely manner and to a level able to fulfil the full range of Alliance missions, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and defence. This will include the ability to reinforce any area at risk and to establish a multinational presence when and where this is needed. Forces of various kinds and at various levels of readiness will be capable of flexible employment in both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. This will require control of lines of communication, and appropriate support and exercise arrangements.
 60. The interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and public affairs. Cooperation between the Alliance's military and civil bodies will accordingly remain essential.
 61. The Alliance's ability to accomplish the full range of its missions will rely increasingly on multinational forces, complementing national commitments to NATO for the Allies concerned. Such forces, which are applicable to the full range of Alliance missions, demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a credible collective defence; enhance Alliance cohesion; and reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the ESDI

within the Alliance. Multinational forces, particularly those capable of deploying rapidly for collective defence or for non-Article 5 crisis response operations, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions, an approach which underlies the implementation of the CJTF concept. For peace support operations, effective multinational formations and other arrangements involving Partners will be valuable. In order to exploit fully the potential offered by multinational formations, improving interoperability, inter alia through sufficient training and exercises, is of the highest importance.

Characteristics of Nuclear Forces

62. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war. They will continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.
63. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy in preventing war. They will be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.
64. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes in the security situation, including reduced conventional force levels in Europe and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should it be

necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence has significantly improved. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them are therefore extremely remote. Since 1991, therefore, the Allies have taken a series of steps which reflect the post-Cold War security environment. These include a dramatic reduction of the types and numbers of NATO's sub-strategic forces including the elimination of all nuclear artillery and ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles; a significant relaxation of the readiness criteria for nuclear-armed forces; and the termination of standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans. NATO's nuclear forces no longer target any country. Nonetheless, NATO will maintain, at the minimum level consistent with the prevailing security environment, adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the transatlantic link. These will consist of dual capable aircraft and a small number of United Kingdom Trident warheads. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed in normal circumstances on surface vessels and attack submarines.

Part V - Conclusion

65. As the North Atlantic Alliance enters its sixth decade, it must be ready to meet the challenges and opportunities of a new century. The Strategic Concept reaffirms the enduring purpose of the Alliance and sets out its fundamental security tasks. It enables a transformed NATO to contribute to the evolving security environment, supporting security and stability with the strength of its shared commitment to democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The Strategic Concept will govern the Alliance's security and defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence arrangements, and will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment. In an uncertain world the need for effective defence remains, but in reaffirming this commitment the Alliance will also continue making full use of every opportunity to help build an undivided continent by promoting and fostering the vision of a Europe whole and free.

Appendix H

Russia's New National Security Concept, 2000^{*}

I. Russia in the World Community

The situation in the world is characterized by a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. Following the end of the bipolar confrontation era, two mutually-exclusive trends took shape. The first of these trends shows itself in the strengthened economic and political positions of a significant number of states and their integrative associations and in improved mechanisms for multilateral management of international processes. Economic, political, science and technological, environmental and information factors are playing an ever-increasing role. Russia will facilitate the formation of an ideology of establishing a multipolar world on this basis. The second trend shows itself in attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (including the use of military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law. The formation of international relations is accompanied by competition and also by the aspiration of a number of states to strengthen their influence on global politics, including by creating weapons of mass destruction. Military force and violence remain substantial aspects of international relations. Russia is one of the world's major countries, with centuries of history and rich cultural traditions. Despite the complex international situation and its own temporary difficulties, Russia continues to play an important role in global processes by virtue of its great economic, scientific, technological and military potential and its unique strategic location on the Eurasian continent.

There are prospects for the Russian Federation's broader integration into the world economy and for expanded cooperation with international economic and financial institutions. The commonality of interests of Russia and other states is objectively preserved in many

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international security problems, including opposing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, settling and preventing regional conflicts, fighting international terrorism and the drugs trade, and resolving acute ecological problems of a global nature, including nuclear and radiation safety.

At the same time, a number of states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways. Attempts to ignore Russia's interests when solving major issues of international relations, including conflict situations, are capable of undermining international security, stability, and the positive changes achieved in international relations.

Terrorism is transnational in nature and poses a threat to world stability. This issue has exacerbated sharply in many countries, including in the Russian Federation, and to fight it requires unification of efforts by the entire international community, increased effectiveness of existing ways of countering this threat, and also urgent action to neutralize it.

II. Russia's National Interests

Russia's national interests are the combined and balanced interests of the individual, society and the state in economic; domestic political, social, international, informational, military, border, ecological security. They are long-term in nature and define the main goals and strategic and short-term goals of the state's domestic and foreign policy. The national interests are secured by institutions of state authority, which may also act in coordination with public organizations operating on the basis of the constitution and legislation of the Russian Federation.

The interests of the individual lie in exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms and provision of personal security; in an improved quality and standard of living; and in physical, spiritual and intellectual development.

The interests of society lie in strengthening democracy; creating a rule-of-law and social state; in achieving and maintaining public harmony and in the spiritual renewal of Russia. The interests of the state lie in the inviolability of the constitutional system and of Russia's sovereignty and territorial integrity; in political, economic and social stability; in unconditional assurance of lawfulness and maintenance of law and order; and in the development of international cooperation on

equal terms and to mutual benefit. Russia's national interests may be assured only on the basis of sustainable economic development. Therefore Russia's national interests in economics are of key importance.

Russia's national interests in the domestic political sphere lie in stability of the constitutional system and of state authority and its institutions; in ensuring civil peace and national accord, territorial integrity, unity of the legal domain, and law and order; in completing the process of establishing a democratic society; and in removing factors causing and feeding social, intercommunal and religious conflicts, political extremism, national and religious separatism, and terrorism.

Russia's national interests in the social sphere lie in assurance of a high standard of living for its people. The national interests in the spiritual sphere lie in preservation and strengthening of society's moral values, traditions of patriotism and humanism, and the country's cultural and scientific potential.

Russia's national interests in the international sphere lie in upholding its sovereignty and strengthening its position as a great power and as one of the influential centres of a multipolar world, in development of equal and equitable relations with all countries and integrative associations and in particular with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia's traditional partners, in universal observance of human rights and freedoms and the impermissibility of dual standards in this respect.

Russia's national interests in the informational sphere lie in observance of its citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms to receive and make use of information, in the development of modern telecommunications, and in protecting the state's information resources from unsanctioned access.

Russia's national interests in the military sphere lie in protection of its independence, sovereignty and state and territorial integrity, in the prevention of military aggression against Russia and its allies and in ensuring the conditions for peaceful and democratic development of the state.

Russia's national interests in border policy lie in the establishment of political, legal, organizational and other conditions for ensuring reliable protection of the state border of the Russian Federation, and in observance of the procedure and rules laid down by Russian Federation

legislation for the carrying on of economic and all other kinds of activity within the borders of the Russian Federation.

Russia's national interests in the environmental sphere lie in the preservation and improvement of the environment.

A vital component of Russia's national interests is protection of the individual, society and state from terrorism, including international terrorism, and also from extraordinary situations, both natural and man-made, and their consequences, and in times of war from the dangers arising from the conduct and consequences of military action.

III. Threats to the Russian Federation's National Security

The condition of the national economy and incomplete nature of the system and structure of the authorities of state and of society, social and political polarization of society and criminalization of social relations, the growth of organized crime and terrorism, and a deterioration in intercommunal and international relations are all creating a broad range of internal and external threats to the country's security.

In the economy, these threats are of a comprehensive nature and are caused above all by a substantial contraction in the gross domestic product; reduced investment and innovation; diminished scientific and technological potential; stagnation in agriculture; a distorted banking system; growth in the state's internal and external debt; and domination of exports by fuel, raw materials and energy components of imports by food and consumer items, including consumer essentials.

A weakened scientific and technological potential, reduction in research in strategically-important areas of science and technology and departure for abroad of specialists and intellectual property mean that Russia is faced with the threat of loss of its leading world positions, decay of its high-technology industries, increased dependence on foreign technology and the undermining of its ability to defend itself.
...

The fundamental threats in the international sphere are brought about by the following factors:

- the desire of some states and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE;
- the danger of a weakening of Russia's political, economic and military influence in the world;

- the strengthening of military-political blocs and alliances, above all NATO's eastward expansion;
- the possible emergence of foreign military bases and major military presences in the immediate proximity of Russian borders;
- proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles;
- the weakening of integrational processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States;
- outbreak and escalation of conflicts near the state border of the Russian Federation and the external borders of CIS member states;
- territorial claims on Russia.

Threats to the Russian Federation's national security in the international sphere can be seen in attempts by other states to oppose a strengthening of Russia as one of the influential centres of a multipolar world, to hinder the exercise of its national interests and to weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, Transcaucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific Region. Terrorism represents a serious threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. International terrorism is waging an open campaign to destabilize Russia.

There is an increased threat to the national security of the Russian Federation in the information sphere. A serious danger arises from the desire of a number of countries to dominate the global information domain space and to expel Russia from the external and internal information market; from the development by a number of states of "information warfare" concepts that entail creation of ways of exerting a dangerous effect on other countries' information systems, of disrupting information and telecommunications systems and data storage systems, and of gaining unauthorized access to them. The level and scope of the military threat are growing.

Elevated to the rank of strategic doctrine, NATO's transition to the practice of using military force outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could destabilize the entire global strategic situation. The growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers and their enhanced ability to create new weapons and military equipment could provoke a new phase of the arms race and radically alter the forms and methods of warfare.

Foreign special services and the organizations they use are increasing their activity in the Russian Federation. Adverse trends in the military sphere are being assisted by delays in reforming the military and the defence industry of the Russian Federation, by inadequate funding for defence and by a poor regulatory and legal framework. At the present

time, this can be seen in the critically low level of operational and military training in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and of the other forces and military bodies and authorities, and in the impermissible drop in equipment of the forces with modern armaments and military and special hardware, and in the extreme acuteness of social problems; this leads to a weakening of the military security of the Russian Federation as a whole.

Threats to the national security and interests of the Russian Federation in the border sphere are caused by the following:

- economic, demographic and cultural-religious expansion by neighbouring states into Russian territory;
- increased activity by cross-border organized crime and also by foreign terrorist organizations.

The threat of a deteriorating environmental situation in the country and depletion of natural resources depends directly on the state of the economy and society's willingness to appreciate the global nature and importance of these issues. For Russia this threat is especially great because of the domination position in industry of the fuel and energy sector, inadequate legislation for environmental protection, lack or limited use of energy-saving technologies, and low environmental awareness. There is a trend for Russia to be used as a place for reprocessing and burying environmentally dangerous materials and substances.

Against this background the weakening of state supervision and inadequate legal and economic levers for averting and relieving emergencies are increasing the risk of man-made disasters in all sectors of the economy.

IV. Ensuring the National Security of the Russian Federation

The following are the principal tasks for ensuring the Russian Federation's national security:

- to promptly detect and identify external and internal threats to national security;
- to take short- and long-term action to avert and remove internal and external threats;
- to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the security of its border lands;
- to improve the economy and pursue an independent and socially-oriented economic policy;

- to overcome the Russian Federation's scientific and technological dependence on external sources;
 - to ensure citizens' personal security and constitutional rights and freedoms in Russia;
 - to improve the system of state power in the Russian Federation, the system of federal relations and local self-government and legislation; to create harmonious relations between communities, and to strengthen law and order and preserve socio-political stability in society;
 - to ensure unwavering compliance with Russian Federation legislation by all citizens and officials, state bodies, political parties and public and religious organizations;
 - to ensure Russia's cooperation, especially with the world's leading countries, on equal and mutually advantageous terms;
 - to increase the state's military potential and maintaining it at a sufficient level;
 - to strengthening the regime of nonproliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles;
 - to take effective action to identify, avert and intercept intelligence and subversive activities by foreign states against the Russian Federation;
 - to fundamentally improve the country's ecological situation.
- It is an important priority of state policy to ensure national interests and uphold the country's economic interests.
- The following are important tasks in foreign economic activities:
- to pave the way for international integration of the Russian economy;
 - to expand markets for Russian products;
 - to create a single economic domain with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Against a background of liberalization of Russia's foreign trade and increased competition on the global market for goods and services, there must be greater protection of the interests of Russian producers.

...

Effective action must be taken in currency regulation, to pave the way for an end to payments in foreign currency on the domestic market and to end the uncontrolled export of capital.

The main directions for ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation in matters of the domestic economy are:

- legal support for reforms and creation of an effective mechanism for monitoring observance of Russian Federation legislation;
- strengthening state regulation in the economy;

- taking measures essential to overcoming the consequences of the economic crisis, and preserve and develop scientific, technological and production potential;
- effect a transition to economic growth with a diminished likelihood of man-made disasters, a transition to greater competitiveness of industrial products and to improved wellbeing of the people.

...

The following are the fundamental directions for protecting Russia's constitutional system:

- to ensure the priority of federal legislation and improve to this effect the legislation of constituent parts of the Russian Federation;
- to develop organizational and legal mechanisms for protecting the integrity of the state, and unity of the legal domain and Russia's national interests;
- to develop and implement a regional policy that ensures an optimum balance of federal and regional interests;
- to improve the mechanism for preventing the appearance of political parties and public associations that pursue separatist and anticonstitutional goals and for stopping their activities.

Efforts aimed at fighting crime and corruption require consolidation. It is very much in Russia's interests to uproot the economic and socio-political causes of these socially dangerous phenomena and to draw up a comprehensive system for protecting the individual, society and the state against criminality.

The formation of a system of effective social preventive measures and education of law-abiding citizens is of a top priority task. These measures must be subordinated to the interests of protecting every person's right to personal security regardless of race, nationality, language, origin, property interests or official status, place of residence, religion, membership of public associations or other circumstances.

It is vital when fighting crime to:

- identify, eliminate and prevent causes and conditions engendering crime;
- strengthen the state's role as guarantor of security of the individual and society, and create the legal framework necessary for this and the mechanism for applying it;
- enlist state authorities, within the bounds of their authority, in the prevention of illegal actions;

- expand mutually-beneficial international collaboration in law and order, primarily with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Decisions made and steps taken by state authorities in the fight against organized crime must be open, specific, and understandable to every citizen, they must be preventive in nature, they must ensure equality of all before the law and inevitability of liability, and they must rely on society's support.

The development of a legal base as the foundation for reliably protecting citizens' rights and lawful interests, as well as observance of Russia's obligations under international law in the sphere of fighting crime and protecting human rights are needed first and foremost for preventive measures and for crime-fighting. It is important to deprive crime of the sustenance it derives from shortcomings in legislation and the economic and social crisis.

An effective system for financial control, enhanced administrative, civic and legal levers and ways of verifying the assets and sources of income and expenditures of state officials and other employees must be created to prevent corruption in the state apparatus and to eliminate conditions for legalizing criminally acquired capital.

The fight against terrorism, the drug trade and smuggling must be based on a special state-wide set of countermeasures designed to put an end to such activities.

Using the framework of international agreements, there must be effective collaboration with foreign states and their law-enforcement and special agencies, and also with international organizations tasked with fighting terrorism. Broad use must be made of international experience of dealing with this phenomenon and there must be a well-coordinated mechanism for countering international terrorism, closing all available routes for illicit weapons and explosives within the country and preventing their import from abroad. The federal state authorities should pursue within the country persons involved in terrorism irrespective of where acts of terrorism damaging to the Russian Federation were conceived or carried out.

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The following are among priority directions for ensuring ecological security:

- rational use of natural resources and fostering of environmental awareness;
- prevention of environmental pollution by raising the level of safety of technologies connected with the burial and recycling of toxic industrial and household wastes;
- prevention of radioactive contamination of the environment and relief of the consequences of earlier radiation accidents and disasters;
- ecologically safe storage and reprocessing of arms removed from the order of battle, above all nuclear powered submarines, ships and vessels with nuclear power plants, nuclear munitions, liquid rocket propellants, and fuel of nuclear power stations;
- storage and destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles in a way that is environmentally safe and safe for public health;
- creation of ecologically clean technologies, a search for ways of making practical use of environmentally friendly sources of energy, and urgent action in environmentally-vulnerable areas of the Russian Federation.

A new approach is essential for the organization and conduct of civil defence in the Russian Federation and there must be a qualitative improvement to the unified state system for early warning and removal of emergency situations, including its further integration into equivalent systems of foreign countries.

The foreign policy of the Russian Federation should be designed to:

- pursue an active foreign-policy course;
- strengthen key mechanisms, above all of the UN Security Council, for multilateral management of world political and economic processes;
- ensure favourable conditions for the country's economic and social development and for global and regional stability;
- protect the lawful rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad, through the use of political, economic and other measures;
- develop relations with CIS member states in accordance with principles of international law, and developing integrative processes within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States that meet Russia's interests;
- ensure Russia's full-fledged involvement in global and regional economic and political structures;
- assist in settling conflicts, including peacekeeping activities under UN, OSCE and CIS aegis;
- achieve progress in nuclear arms control and maintain strategic stability in the world through states' compliance with their international obligations in this respect;

- fulfil mutual obligations to reduce and eliminate weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms, carrying out confidence- and stability-building measures, ensure international supervision of the export of goods and technologies and over the provision of military and dual-purpose services;
- adapt existing arms-control and disarmament agreements in line with the new climate in international relations, and also develop when necessary new agreements especially for enhancing confidence- and security-building measures;
- assist in establishing zones free of weapons of mass destruction;
- develop international cooperation in the fight against transnational crime and terrorism.

Ensuring the Russian Federation's military security is a crucial direction of state activity. The main goal in this respect is to ensure an adequate response to threats which may arise in the 21st century, with rational spending on defence.

In preventing war and armed conflicts, the Russian Federation prefers political, diplomatic, economic and other non-military means. The national interests of the Russian Federation, however, require the presence of military power sufficient for its defence. The Russian Federation armed forces play the main role in ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation.

A vital task of the Russian Federation is to exercise deterrence to prevent aggression on any scale and nuclear or otherwise, against Russia and its allies.

The Russian Federation should possess nuclear forces that are capable of guaranteeing the infliction of the desired extent of damage against any aggressor state or coalition of states in any conditions and circumstances.

In their peacetime order of battle the Russian Federation armed forces should be able to provide dependable protection against aerial attack; to perform jointly with other troops, military units and entities missions to repulse aggression in a local war (armed conflict); and to carry out strategic deployments for missions in a large-scale war. The Russian Federation armed forces should also ensure Russia's ability to carry out peacekeeping duties.

One of the vital strategic directions in providing for the Russian Federation's military security is effective collaboration and cooperation with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The interests of ensuring Russia's national security predetermine the need, under appropriate circumstances, for Russia to have a military presence in certain strategically important regions of the world. The stationing of limited military contingents (military bases, naval units) there on a treaty basis must ensure Russia's readiness to fulfil its obligations and to assist in forming a stable military-strategic balance of forces in regions, and must enable the Russian Federation to react to a crisis situation in its initial stage and achieve its foreign-policy goals.

The Russian Federation considers the possibility of employing military force to ensure its national security based on the following principles:

- use of all available forces and assets, including nuclear, in the event of need to repulse armed aggression, if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective;
- use of military force inside the country is allowed in strict conformity with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and with federal laws in the event of emergence of a threat to citizens' lives and also of violent change to the constitutional system.

An important role in ensuring Russia's national interests belongs to the defence industry. Restructuring and conversion of the defence industry should proceed without detriment to the development of new technologies and science-and-technology opportunities or to modernization of armaments, military and special equipment and the presence of Russian manufacturers on the world markets.

The way should be paved for organization of the priority fundamental, forecasting and original research, which ensure the existence of a promising and advanced science-and-technology sector in the interests of defence and the state's security.

The following are principal tasks as regards border security:

- to establish the required regulatory and legal framework;
- to develop international cooperation in this area;
- to counter economic, demographic and cultural-religious expansion into Russian territory by other states;
- to intercept transnational organized crime and illegal migration;
- to engage in collective measures to ensure security in the border zones of member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The following are crucial tasks for ensuring the Russian Federation's information security:

- exercise of citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms in the sphere of information;
- improvement and protection of the domestic information infrastructure and integration of Russia into the world information domain;
- countering the threat of opposition in the information sphere.

The use of intelligence and counterintelligence resources for the timely discovery of threats and identification of their sources is of particular importance when ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation.

The system for ensuring the Russian Federation's national security is created and developed in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, Russian Federation presidential decrees and directives, Russian Federation government decrees and resolutions, and federal programmes in this area.

The basis of the system for ensuring the Russian Federation's national security consists of the agencies and resources for ensuring national security that carry out political, legal, organizational, economic, military and other measures aimed at ensuring the security of the individual, society and the state.

The powers, composition, principles and operating procedure of the agencies and forces ensuring the Russian Federation's national security are defined in the relevant Russian Federation legislative instruments.

The following are involved in forming and implementing policy for ensuring the Russian Federation's national security:

- the president of the Russian Federation, who within the bounds of his constitutional powers directs the agencies and resources for ensuring the Russian Federation's national security; sanctions actions to ensure national security; in accordance with Russian Federation legislation forms, reorganizes and abolishes subordinate agencies and forces for ensuring national security; issues messages, appeals and directives on national security issues and in his annual message to the Russian Federation Federal Assembly specifies individual provisions of the Russian Federation National Security Blueprint and defines the directions of the country's current domestic and foreign policy;
- the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, which on the basis of the Russian Federation constitution and on representation by the Russian

Federation president and government forms the legislative framework for ensuring the state's national security;

- the Russian Federation government, which within the bounds of its powers and in consideration of priorities in the area of ensuring the country's national security formulated in annual messages of the president to the Federal Assembly, coordinates the activities of federal executive authorities as well as of executive authorities of the constituent parts of the Russian Federation, and forms items of the federal budget for implementing specific special-purpose programmes in these areas;
- the Russian Federation Security Council, which works for the advance identification and assessment of threats to national security, drafts operational decisions to prevent them for the president; develops proposals for ensuring the country's national security and proposals on updating individual provisions of the Russian Federation National Security Blueprint; coordinates the forces and agencies for ensuring national security; and monitors implementation of decisions in this area by federal executive authorities and authorities of the constituent parts of the Russian Federation;
- federal executive authorities, which ensure compliance with Russian Federation legislation and implementation of decisions of the Russian Federation president and government in the area of national security; within the bounds of their competence develop regulatory legal instruments in this area and submit them to the Russian Federation president and government;
- executive authorities of the constituent parts of the Russian Federation, which coordinate with federal executive authorities in implementing Russian Federation legislation and decisions of the Russian Federation president and government in national security, and implementing federal programmes, plans and directives issued by the Supreme Commander in the area of Russian Federation defence security; with institutions of local government act to involve citizens, public associations and other organizations in helping to resolve national security problems in accordance with Russian Federation legislation; make proposals to federal executive authorities for upgrading the system of ensuring national security.

The Russian Federation intends to decisively and firmly uphold its national interests. The existing legal democratic institutions and structure of Russian Federation state authorities and the broad involvement of political parties and public associations in implementing the Russian Federation National Security Blueprint serve as a guarantee of Russia's dynamic development in the 21st century.

Appendix I

NPG Communiqué, December 2000*

Final Communiqué

Ministerial Meeting of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group on 5 December 2000

The Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 5th December 2000.

Collective defence planning remains the cornerstone of the Alliance's ability to provide for the defence and security of its members. Today we reviewed the national defence plans of Allies for the period 2001-2005 and beyond and have adopted a five-year force plan which addresses the requirements of the future security environment.

In reviewing Allies' plans, we paid particular attention to the progress of implementation of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), launched by Alliance Heads of State and Government at Washington last year. We concluded that the DCI has significantly influenced the future force plans of Allies and we welcomed the efforts underway to improve Alliance capabilities in key capability areas such as provision of strategic sea and airlift, precision guided munitions and further progress in consultation, command and control capabilities. We recognised, however, that it will be some time before Allies have fully developed many of the capabilities highlighted in the DCI, partly reflecting resource constraints. In this context, we also took stock of Allies' defence expenditure plans. We noted that, this year, more Allies project real increases in defence expenditure than was the case last year and that greater emphasis is being put on improvements in the management of defence resources and the potential benefits of multinational, joint and common funding projects as ways to ensure greater cost-effectiveness in providing the military capabilities the Alliance needs. On the other hand, we realise that, in many cases, additional funds appear necessary to achieve the required capability improvements set out in the DCI.

* Text from NATO on-line library at
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-115e.htm>.

We agreed on the need to continue to pursue greater efficiency in defence spending and to ensure that defence spending priorities match identified Alliance requirements. We also agreed to continue to seek the necessary resources to ensure that our forces are properly equipped, manned, trained and supported for the full range of Alliance missions. We will continue to review the success of our efforts, based on a number of important indicators, as part of our regular force planning work.

As part of this year's annual defence review we also noted the planned contributions by many Allies to support the European Union Headline Goal, which were announced at the Capabilities Commitment Conference. We expect that the objectives of the Headline Goal and DCI will be mutually reinforcing and will give further impetus to the development of the military capabilities of the countries concerned. Such enhanced capabilities would also strengthen the ability of the Alliance to contribute to ensuring security and stability. For each nation, there is only one set of forces and resources. The possible overlapping of NATO and EU requirements should be addressed and coordinated by the two organisations in a coherent, transparent and consistent way, in order to harmonise those requirements and to review progress in meeting them. In any event the autonomy of NATO and EU institutional decision-making should be fully respected. We will, therefore, continue to take account of commitments made by Allies concerned to other organisations, to the extent that they have consequences for NATO force planning.

Against this background, we approved new Ministerial Guidance to provide the framework for NATO and national defence planning in the period until 2008 and beyond. The actions the Alliance had to undertake last year to end the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, and the instability that still exists in this and other regions, provide a stark reminder of the need for the Alliance to have substantial and robust forces able to react rapidly to emerging crises. The ability and determination of the Alliance to respond to non-Article 5 crises which threaten Euro-Atlantic security are closely linked to its ability and resolve to continue to deter and defend against aggression directed at Allies. The new Ministerial Guidance, therefore, emphasises the importance of having sufficient forces with the required capabilities for all likely missions, able to deploy quickly and to sustain themselves for as long as required, able to carry out their tasks and protect themselves effectively, and able to operate together effectively with the forces of other nations engaged in the same operations.

At our Nuclear Planning Group meeting, we reviewed the status of NATO's nuclear forces and other related issues and activities. We received with appreciation presentations by the United States Secretary of Defense which included further information on U.S.-Russian efforts to establish a Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow to share information from early warning systems regarding missile launches.

We affirmed the continuing validity of the fundamentally political purpose and the principles underpinning the nuclear forces of the Allies as set out in the Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept. NATO's nuclear forces are a credible and effective element of the Alliance's strategy of preventing war, and they are maintained at the minimum level of sufficiency to preserve peace and stability, and under conditions that meet the highest standards of safety and security. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO continue to provide an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the Alliance.

We reaffirmed the continued importance attached by Allies to full implementation of and compliance with international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. We confirmed our commitments made at this year's Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will contribute to carrying forward the conclusions reached there. NATO Allies continue to support the ratification, early entry into force, and full implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and remain committed to the immediate commencement and rapid conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable and universal Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

We expressed our full support to the United States and the Russian Federation for an early implementation of START II and for future negotiations on the basis of an agreed START III framework to reduce significantly the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads of both countries. We also recalled the drastic reductions of NATO's nuclear forces in the new security environment, and renewed our call on Russia to complete the reductions in its non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile, as pledged in 1991 and 1992 for implementation by the end of the year 2000.

We welcomed the resumption of exchanges with the Russian Federation on a range of nuclear weapons issues, under the auspices of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, and we look forward to

further exchanges in the spirit of improved transparency and full reciprocity.

At the 1999 Washington Summit, the Alliance agreed to consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament in the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons. We received a comprehensive final report on the nuclear elements of this work and endorsed its conclusions, in particular proposals made in the area of confidence and security building measures and increased transparency as a basis for enhanced understanding, trust and cooperation. We commend the High Level Group for this valuable contribution to the overall Alliance work in fulfilling the Summit remit